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Abstract
We shed some light on fairness preferences regarding tax evasion. Individuals perceive
income inequality which they are responsible for as fair (e.g. work effort) while inequal-
ity resulting from factors outside their reach is regarded as unfair (e.g. productivity or
wage rate). This affects the incentives to hide income from tax authorities and supply
labor. We set up a model where individuals simultaneously choose unreported income
and work effort given a linear taxation scheme. We show the conditions for which indi-
viduals respond with lower or higher unreported income and work effort when fair tax
evasion is introduced. Beyond, it can be shown that unreported income increases while
work effort decreases when the tax rate is raised. Finally, we consider a majority voting
over redistributive taxation. Thereby, it is shown that the median voter prefers lower
(higher) taxation if she evades less (more) taxes than would be fair since raising the tax
rate would enlarge (reduce) the deviation from fair tax evasion. This affects the moral
cost as peceived by the individuals.
JEL classification: D31, D78, H26, H30
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1 Introduction
The European sovereign-debt crisis in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis
emphasizes the role of tax compliance behavior for balanced national budgets which has, not
least, recently been illustrated by the case of Greece. The subject of tax evasion has found its
way into modern economic theory in the 1970s. In their seminal work Allingham and Sandmo
(1972) analyze the individual behavior regarding the declaration of income to the tax authorities.
As individuals face a probability of getting caught and penalized the income reporting decision
takes place under uncertainty. They analyze the interrelations between individual tax evasion,
risk attitudes and the detection probability. Based on this, further theoretical works (see e.g.
Christiansen, 1980; Sandmo, 1981; Yitzhaki, 1987; Falkinger, 1991; Andreoni et al., 1998 or
Bernasconi, 1998) on individual tax compliance behavior emerged.
Beyond that, the case of tax evasion has been considered from an empirical (e.g. Clotfelter,
1983; Slemrod, 1985; Feinstein, 1991; Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996) or experi-
mental perspective (e.g. Becker et al., 1987; Alm et al., 1992; Mittone, 2006; Kleven et al.,
2011). As has already been pointed out by Gordon (1989), Sandmo (2005) or Traxler (2010)
the conventional portfolio choice approach to tax evasion is not able to explain a crucial part of
the empirical results whereupon people seem to evade less taxes than would be expected from
a pure risk perspective. According to Alm et al. (1992) individuals comply with the tax law
even when the probability of being detected is zero. A common feature of the standard tax
evasion models is that non-pecuniary motives and fairness perceptions are neglected. These
social motives could play a vital role for individual tax compliance behavior (see e.g. Bosco and
Mittone, 1997).
Consequently, social incentives has received growing attention in the theory of tax evasion.
The works of Gordon (1989), Myles and Naylor (1996) as well as Traxler (2010) extends the
standard tax evasion literature by social norms and group conformity. In these settings the
expected degree of tax evasion in society and therefore stigma influences the individual evasion
decision. In a similar vein, Kim (2003) considers the relation between the distribution of in-
come and tax evasion stigma. Beyond, the approach of Bordignon (1993) sheds some light on
fairness perceptions regarding the fiscal treatment with the provision of public goods as well
as the behavior of other tax payers. Empirical evidence from Spicer and Becker (1980) shows
that individuals feeling unfairly treated by the tax scheme tend to evade more taxes. From a
theoretical perspective Falkinger (1995) analyzes the role of income equity for the tax payer’s
risk prefence and the corresponding tax evasion decision.1 However, it is worth noting that
the relevance of distributive fairness perceptions for individual work effort and the tax evasion
decision is scarcely considered in the beforementioned literature.
From a liberal egalitarian perspective of distributive justice individuals seem to consider the
responsibility of factors underlying income inequality as being important (e.g. Dworkin, 1981;
Fleurbaey, 1995; Kolm, 1996; Roemer 1998 or Cappelen and Tungodden, 2009). If influencable
factors drive income inequality individuals perceive this inequity as rather fair. However, income
1See Cowell (1992) for a basic survey on inequity concepts and tax evasion.
1
inequality resulting from factors which could not be influenced by individuals is considered
as unfair. According to Barth et al. (2013) work effort could be interpreted as individual
responsibility factor while wage rates reflecting talent or productivity are assumed to be not in
an individual’s reach. As governments can only tax the entire individual income this perceived
distinction between justifiable and unjustifiable income inequality plays a vital role for tax
compliance or morale, respectively. Barth et al. (2013) set up an individual decision framework
and confirms the empirical relevance of fair tax evasion. It deserves to be mentioned that this
concept of distributive fairness is also closely correlated to the fairness approach of Alesina et al.
(2002). In their seminal work redistributive tax policies are analyzed where income variance is
divided into a fair (based on effort and investments) and an unfair part (resulting from luck or
illegal activities) where governments are not able to distinguish between the sources of income
inequality. Yet the relevance of tax evasion is neglected in this framework.
Hitherto, the question of how fair tax evasion influences tax rates resulting from a majority
voting has received less attention. Some works consider different aspects of majority voting and
tax evasion (e.g. Alm et al., 1999; Borck, 2004, 2009; Fuest and Huber 2001; Traxler, 2009,
2012). A common feature of these approaches reveals in neglecting social motives for individual
behavior. Thus, our approach aims to contribute to the politico-economic strand of the tax
evasion literature by extending the analysis with individual perceptions of distributive fairness.
We employ the framework of Barth et al. (2013) in order to analyze how exogenous changes
in taxation affects the degree of tax evasion and work effort chosen by individuals. The fair
income depends on work effort as individuals expect to be rewarded for their effort. It is also
perceived as fair to receive the average wage rate. These fairness preceptions affect the fair tax
liability and subsequently the degree of tax evasion which is regarded as fair. Then, deviations
from the fair level of tax evasion give rise to a moral cost. This moral cost could be influenced by
varying the unreported income as well as the individual work effort. We show how individuals
changes the income which is not declared to the tax authorities as well as the labor supply when
the fairness preference concerning tax evasion is introduced. The decision depends on whether
the individual receives an unfairly high or low net wage as well as on the difference between
actual and fair tax evasion. Further, it can be shown that individuals declare less income to the
tax authorities and reduce work effort when the tax rate is raised. Based on this, we consider the
political equilibrium regarding redistributive taxation constituted by majority voting. Thereby,
we show that the median voter prefers higher (lower) taxation if she evades more (less) taxes
than would be fair since raising the tax rate would reduce (enlarge) the deviation from fairness
and hence affects the moral cost.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents and defines the underlying
tax evasion fairness concept. The individual decision on tax evasion and work effort for a given
tax policy is considered in section 3. Based on this, we analyze how changes in the fairness
preference as well as in the tax policy affects the individual decisions to work and to declare
income to the tax authorities. In section 4, we turn to the political equilibrium concerning
redistributive taxation which is constituted by means of majority voting. The analysis is then
concluded in section 5.
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2 The model
We consider an economy inhabited by n individuals. Each individual i receives a wage rate wi
which reflects talent or productivity and decides on her work effort ℓi. The individual pre-tax
income is then given by xi = wiℓi. Further, let us denote w¯ = 1/n
∑
iwi and ℓ¯ = 1/n
∑
i ℓi
as the average wage rate and work effort, respectively. Bear in mind, that each individual is
presumed to neglect the effect of changes in her own wage rate or work effort on the average
values. This seems plausible for a large number n of individuals. The government levies a linear
income tax rate τ ∈ [0, 1] which serves to finance a lumpsum transfer B = τw¯ℓ¯. This indirectly
progressive taxation scheme leads to an individual net-tax liability Ti = τwiℓi − B. Each
individual takes the public benefit as exogenously given. Hence, individuals are presumed to
not anticipate the balanced governmental budget (fiscal illusion) which seems to be reasonable
for a large population. Further note that income redistribution is presumed to be the only
purpose of the tax system. Hence, we abstract from the possibility that governments provide
public goods.
Tax evasion and post-tax income. Each individual chooses to hide the amount ui ∈ [0, xi]
of income from the tax authorities. This leads to the amount e = τui of evaded taxes. The
probability of being detected is given by p(ui). By following Yitzhaki (1987) we assume the
detection probability as being increasing (and convex) in unreported income, i.e. p′ > 0 (p′′ > 0).
If tax evasion is uncovered the individual has to pay a penalty tax t(ui) > e which also increases
(at an increasing rate) with the unreported income: t′ > 0 (t′′ > 0). Thus, the expected penalty
is given by φ(ui) = p(ui)t(ui) with φ
′ > 0 (φ′′ > 0). Taking this into account
y(wi, ℓi, ui, τi) = (1− τ)wiℓi +B + τui − φ(ui) (1)
represents the expected net income each individual i receives. In the following this actual net
income has to be distinguished from the income individuals perceive as fair.
Fair income and justifiable tax evasion. According to Barth et al. (2013) we define
x∗i = ℓiw¯ as the fair income perceived by each individual. Hence, individuals consider the
fair income as being proportional to the work effort while it would be fair if any individual
receive the average wage rate. In other words, differences in the wage rate would result in
unfair income inequality. This is in line with the abovementioned liberal egalitarian theories of
distributive justice whereupon individuals consider income inequality resulting from differences
in impressionable factors, i.e. work effort, as fair while inequalities caused by suggestable factors,
i.e. wage rate or talent, as unfair. Thus, individuals disclaim tax-induced reductions in income
inequality resulting from differences in work effort. As governments can only tax the entire
income and are therefore not able to differ between the sources of inequality individuals could
consider tax evasion as fair or unfair, respectively. Based on this we obtain the fair tax liability
T ∗ = xi − x
∗
i = ℓi(wi − w¯), (2)
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which would lead to the fair income. For low-skilled workers (wi < w¯) the fair tax payment
is negative while it turns out to be positive for high-skilled workers (wi > w¯). This reflects
the individual desire for income redistribution in order to reduce wage rate or productivity
differences.2 The fair amount of tax evasion is then given by
e∗i = Ti − T
∗
i = ℓi [w¯ − (1− τ )wi]−B (3)
which could be positive (for Ti > T
∗
i ) or negative (for Ti < T
∗
i ). In other words, individuals with
a low productivity perceive tax evasion as fair while high-productivity individuals do not. We
can directly see that the fair tax evasion is strictly decreasing with the wage rate (∂e∗i /∂wi < 0)
while the effect of work effort depends on the wage differential (∂e∗i /∂ℓi = w¯ − (1− τ)wi R 0).
If the net wage is unfairly low ((1 − τ)wi < w¯) the effect of a higher work effort on actual net
income would be larger than on the fair income. Consequently, the fair tax payment grows
faster than the actual tax liability which enhances the fair amount of tax evasion. The opposite
holds for an unfairly high wage rate ((1− τ)wi > w¯).
Eventually, we define di = ei − e
∗
i as the difference between actual and fair tax evasion.
Partially differentiating di with respect to unreported income ui, work effort ℓi and the tax rate
τ yields:
∂di
∂ui
= τ ≥ 0, (4)
∂di
∂ℓi
= −
∂e∗
∂ℓi
= −[w¯ − (1− τ)wi], (5)
∂di
∂τ
= ui − wiℓi ≤ 0. (6)
Obviously, the difference di between actual and fair tax evastion increases with unreported
income ui for positive tax rates τ > 0 and decreases with the tax rate τ if not the entire pre-tax
income is hided from the tax authorities, i.e. ui ∈ [0, wiℓi). However, analogously to the fair
tax evasion the effect of individual work effort on di depends on the difference between the net
wage rate and the fair wage. In case of unfairly high net wages ([1 − τ ]wi > w¯) the difference
di is increasing with individual work effort while for an unfairly low net wage ([1 − τ ]wi < w¯)
raising work effort reduces di. It is worth mentioning that we obtain the inverse relation of
∂e∗
∂ℓi
since changing work effort affects the fair tax evasion while the actual tax evasion remains
unchanged.
Individual preferences. In the following, we assume individuals to behave risk neutral
concerning changes in expected post-tax income.3 This allows us to separately focus on the
effects of tax fairness on tax evasion and work effort behavior. Individual preferences are
represented by the additively-separable utility function
Vi = V (ui, ℓi) = y(wi, ℓi, ui)− αω(ℓi)− βψ(di), (7)
2For wi = w¯ the fair tax amount would be zero and hence the individual prefers zero taxation.
3In this case, individuals maximize expected income rather than expected utility.
4
where y > 0 denotes the expected income and ω > 0 captures the disutility from labor which is
increasing (and convex) in work effort, i.e. ω′ > 0 (ω′′ > 0). The parameter α represents work
morale or laziness. The third term of (7) with ψ(di) > 0 reflects the moral cost of deviating
from fair tax evasion. If the actual tax evasion exceeds (deceeds) the fair level, the psychic
cost ψ is assumed to increase (decrease) with the difference di: ψ
′ < 0 for di < 0 and ψ
′ > 0
for di ≥ 0. Furthermore the moral cost function is convex in its argument, i.e. ψ
′′ ≥ 0. The
parameter β represents the strength of the tax fairness considerations.
3 Individual choice of tax evasion and work effort
We turn to the individual decision on unreported income ui and labor supply ℓi. Taken the tax
policy as exogenously given each individual i = 1, ..., n maximizes utility (7). Differentiating
with respect to ui and ℓi yields the first-order conditions:
∂Vi
∂ui
= τ︸︷︷︸
(A)
−φ′(ui)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
−τβψ′(di)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C)
= 0, (8)
∂Vi
∂ℓi
= (1− τ)wi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
−αω′(ℓi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
−βψ′(di)
∂di
∂ℓi︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)
= 0. (9)
Unreported income. According to (8) increasing the individual unreported income ex-
hibits three marginal effects on utility. (A) First, ceteris paribus increasing ui would enhance
expected income by τ which captures the additional tax payment avoided by the individual i.
(B) In contrast, the expected penalty raises by φ′ when more income remains unreported as the
detection probability as well as the penalty tax in case of being caught increases with ui. While
effect (A) constitutes a marginal benefit of tax evasion effect (B) represents the marginal cost.
(C) The third term of (8) captures how an increase in tax evasion affects the moral cost from
evading more or less taxes as would be fair. The sign of effect (C) depends on the sign of ψ′. For
individuals evading less than it would be fair (di < 0) raising di reduces the moral cost (ψ
′ < 0).
As increasing ui enhances the difference di by τ this would be utility enhancing. If, however,
an individual hides more than the fair income (di > 0) from tax authorities a further increase
in di would result in a larger moral cost (ψ
′ > 0).4 Again, increasing the unreported income ui
leads to a higher difference which then raises the moral cost and hence reduces utility. Thus,
effect (C) turns out to be a marginal benefit (di < 0) or cost (di > 0) depending on whether the
individual evades more or less taxes than it is perceived as fair. According to (8) the marginal
cost and benefits has to be equal in the optimum.
Work effort. The first-order condition (9) describes the marginal effects of higher individual
work effort on utility. (a) First, a ceteris paribus raise in work effort enhances the individual
net income by (1− τ)wi which increases utility. (b) On the contrary, as captured by αω
′ higher
work effort results in a higher disutility from labor. The marginal benefit of work effort is
4For di = 0 we get ψ
′ = 0. In this case, the individual evades the fair amount of taxes and therefore the moral
cost effect vanishes.
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represented by effect (a) while effect (b) constitutes the marginal cost. (c) Analogously to the
decision on unreported income, increasing the work effort ceteris paribus affects the moral cost
through a change in the difference di. Whether the moral cost effect of work effort (c) is a
marginal benefit or marginal cost depends on the deviation of actual tax evasion from the fair
level and as well as on the difference between the net wage and the fair wage. Thereby, we have
to consider four cases.
(i) Suppose the individual evades less than the fair level (di < 0 ⇒ ψ
′ < 0) and receives an
unfairly low net wage ((1 − τ)wi < w¯ ⇒
∂di
∂ℓi
< 0). Then, increasing work effort would
magnify the deviation from fair tax evasion and hence constitutes a marginal cost.
(ii) If, however, the individual receives an unfairly high net wage ((1 − τ)wi > w¯ ⇒
∂di
∂ℓi
> 0)
while evading less taxes than would be fair (di < 0 ⇒ ψ
′ < 0) raising work effort would
reduce the deviation from the fair tax evasion. Hence, a raise in ℓi goes along with a
marginal benefit.
(iii) Now let us turn to the case where the individual evades more than the fair level (di >
0 ⇒ ψ′ > 0). In case of receiving an unfairly low net wage ((1 − τ)wi < w¯ ⇒
∂di
∂ℓi
< 0)
the individual could reduce the deviation from fairness or the moral cost by working more.
Thus, raising ℓi is associated with a marginal benefit.
(iv) Finally, we consider the case where the individual evades more than the fair level (di >
0⇒ ψ′ > 0) while receiving an unfairly high net wage ((1− τ)wi > w¯ ⇒
∂di
∂ℓi
> 0). Then,
raising work effort goes along with a higher deviation from fairness and therefore enlarges
the moral cost. Subsequently, increasing ℓi gives rise to a marginal cost.
In a nutshell, each individual is able to reduce the psychic or moral cost of deviating from fair
tax evasion by changing individual work effort or shifting unreported income. While varying
individual work effort affects the fair level of tax evasion changes in unreported income influences
the actual individual tax evasion.
3.1 Changes in the fairness preference
This paragraph explores how changes in the individual desire for fair tax evasion affects the
choice of unreported income and work effort. Therefore, we implicitly differentiate the first-
order conditions (8) and (9) with respect to the fairness preference parameter β in order to
get
∂ui
∂β
= −
1
Vuu
[
−τψ′︸ ︷︷ ︸
= ∂
∂β
∂V
∂u
−βτψ′′
∂di
∂ℓi︸ ︷︷ ︸
= ∂
∂ℓ
∂V
∂u
·
∂ℓi
∂β
]
, (10)
∂ℓi
∂β
= −
1
Vℓℓ
[
−ψ′
∂di
∂ℓi︸ ︷︷ ︸
= ∂
∂β
∂V
∂ℓ
−βτψ′′
∂di
∂ℓi︸ ︷︷ ︸
= ∂
∂u
∂V
∂ℓ
·
∂ui
∂β
]
. (11)
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with Vuu < 0 and Vℓℓ < 0 as utility is concave in the unreported income ui and the individual
work effort ℓi. Thus, it follows −
1
Vuu
> 0 and − 1
Vℓℓ
> 0.
Unreported income and tax evasion fairness. An increase in the fairness preference
exhibits the following marginal utility effects. According to the first term in (10) increasing
β affects the moral cost effect of unreported income ui directly (
∂
∂β
∂V
∂u
). Beyond, a raise in β
affects the moral cost effect of unreported income indirectly via a change in work effort (∂ℓi
∂β
),
cf. the second term of (10). Whether an increase in ℓi would be positive or negative depends
on how work effort changes the difference di between actual and fair tax evasion. As shown
before, for individuals with an unfairly high net wage rate ([1 − τ ]wi > w¯) increasing work
effort enlarges the difference (∂di
∂ℓi
> 0). Consequently, a higher individual work effort reduces
the marginal benefit (when di < 0) or enlarges the marginal cost (for di > 0) of declaring less
income such that hiding income gets less desirable at the margin (− ∂
∂ℓ
∂V
∂u
< 0). However, if the
individual net wage is unfairly low ([1−τ ]wi < w¯) a higher work effort goes along with a smaller
deviation from the fair level of tax evasion (∂di
∂ℓi
< 0). At the margin, this renders declaring less
income to the tax authorities more desirable (− ∂
∂ℓ
∂V
∂u
> 0).
Work effort and tax evasion fairness. With respect to the individual work effort we
can also observe a direct as well as an indirect effect of a higher preference strength β. First,
raising β directly changes the moral cost effect of work effort ( ∂
∂β
∂V
∂ℓ
). If the moral cost effect is
positive (ψ′ ∂di
∂ℓi
> 0) increasing work effort becomes more desirable at the margin. Vice versa,
raising work effort gets less desirable if the moral cost effect is negative (ψ′ ∂di
∂ℓi
< 0). Finally,
the indirect effect of the preference strength β on the marginal cost and benefit of work effort
is represented by the second term in brackets of (11). This effect is similar to the second term
of (10) except that it relates to a change in unreported income ( ∂
∂u
∂V
∂ℓ
). Increasing unreported
income would ceteris paribus increase di by τ . Further increasing work effort when
∂di
∂ℓi
> 0
would then enlarge the marginal cost (if di > 0) or reduce the marginal benefit (for di < 0) such
that working more gets less desirable at the margin (− ∂
∂u
∂V
∂ℓ
< 0). Contrary, if a higher work
effort goes along with a smaller difference, i.e. ∂di
∂ℓi
< 0, an increase in ℓi gets more desirable at
the margin (− ∂
∂u
∂V
∂ℓ
> 0) since the marginal cost shrinks (for di < 0) or the marginal benefit
rises (if di > 0).
Solving the equation system (10) and (11) leads to the following comparative static results:5
sign
∂ui
∂β
= sign
[
−ψ′
]
, (12)
sign
∂ℓi
∂β
= sign
[
−ψ′
∂di
∂ℓi
]
. (13)
We can directly see that the indirect cross effects of tax evasion and work effort play no role since
both effects cancel each other out. According to (12) the sign of ∂ui
β
depends on the sign of ψ′.
If the individual evades less taxes than it would be fair (di < 0⇒ ψ
′ < 0) a raise in unreported
income would reduce the moral cost as the deviation from the fair level gets smaller. Hence
raising ui constitutes a marginal benefit. Introducing or strengthening the preference would
5A detailed derivation is delegated to the appendix.
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enlarge this marginal benefit such that unreported income ui increases with β (
∂ui
∂β
> 0). If,
however, the individual evades more than the fair level (di > 0⇒ ψ
′ > 0) a further raise in the
deviation from fairness would decrease utility. By reducing unreported income the individual
is able to decrease the deviation from the fair tax evasion which enhances utility. Increasing β
would enlarge the positive effect of a reduction in unreported income. Thus, ui is decreasing in
the preference strength (∂ui
∂β
< 0).
Proposition 1 Introducing or strengthening the fairness preference induces individuals to hide
more income from tax authorities if their actual tax evasion is unfairly high. If, however,
individuals evade less taxes than it would be fair, stregthening the desire for tax evasion fairness
leads to a higher unreported income.
Further, the sign of ∂ℓi
β
is determined by the sign of ψ′ ∂di
∂ℓi
, cf. expression (13). At this, we
can distinguish between four cases depending on whether the moral cost effect of work effort
turns out to be positive or negative. As shown before, the moral cost effect of work effort is
negative if
(i) the actual tax evasion is smaller than it would be fair (di < 0⇒ ψ
′ < 0) and the individual
net wage is unfairly low ((1 − τ)wi < w¯⇒
∂di
∂ℓi
< 0), or
(ii) the actual tax evasion is larger than it would be fair (di > 0⇒ ψ
′ > 0) and the individual
net wage is unfairly high ((1 − τ)wi > w¯⇒
∂di
∂ℓi
> 0).
Increasing the preference strength would then enlarge this marginal cost of working. Thus,
individual work effort is decreasing with the preference parameter (
∂ℓ∗i
∂β
< 0). However, the
moral cost effect constitutes a marginal benefit if
(iii) the actual tax evasion is smaller than it would be fair (di < 0⇒ ψ
′ < 0) and the individual
net wage is unfairly high ((1 − τ)wi > w¯⇒
∂di
∂ℓi
> 0), or
(iv) the actual tax evasion is larger than it would be fair (di > 0⇒ ψ
′ > 0) and the individual
net wage is unfairly low ((1 − τ)wi < w¯⇒
∂di
∂ℓi
< 0).
Then, raising the preference strength enhances the marginal benefit of supplying labor. Subse-
quently, the individual responds with a higher work effort if the preference parameter increases
(
∂ℓ∗i
∂β
> 0). These results are then summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Individual work effort is increasing in the fairness preference if an individual
with an unfairly high (low) net wage evades less (more) taxes than it would be fair. If, how-
ever, individuals with an unfairly high (low) net wage evades more (less) taxes than the fair
level, individuals respond with lower work effort when the fairness preference is introduced or
strengthened.
The intuition behind these results is based on the moral cost effect of work effort as described
in the first-order condition (9). After having determined the effect of the fairness preference,
we turn to changes in taxation in the next section.
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3.2 Tax policy changes
Now, we strive to focus on tax-induced changes in unreported income ui and work effort ℓi
chosen by each individual. Implicit differentiation of the first-order conditions (8) and (9) with
respect to the choice variables and the tax rate τ leads to
∂ui
∂τ
= −
1
Vuu
[
1− βψ′ − βτψ′′
∂di
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
= ∂
∂τ
∂V
∂u
−βτψ′′
∂di
∂ℓi︸ ︷︷ ︸
= ∂
∂ℓ
∂V
∂u
·
∂ℓi
∂τ
]
, (14)
∂ℓi
∂τ
= −
1
Vℓℓ
[
−wi + wiβψ
′ − βψ′′
∂di
∂ℓi
∂di
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
= ∂
∂τ
∂V
∂ℓ
−βτψ′′
∂di
∂ℓi︸ ︷︷ ︸
= ∂
∂u
∂V
∂ℓ
·
∂ui
∂τ
]
, (15)
with Vuu < 0 and Vℓℓ < 0 since individual utility is concave in its arguments. Based on this,
the partial effects of taxation on the marginal cost and benefits of hiding income and working
are described.
Unreported income and taxation. According to (14) a tax increase affects the marginal
benefit and cost of hiding income directly ( ∂
∂τ
∂V
∂u
). First, the avoided tax amount increases with
the tax rate by 1. Further, increasing taxation changes the fairness effect by −βψ′ and depends
on the sign of ψ′. For ψ′ > 0 the fairness effect is negative and therefore a marginal cost. If,
however, ψ′ < 0 the opposite holds and increasing unreported income proves to be a marginal
benefit. As increasing the tax rate ceteris paribus reinforces the positive or negative fairness
effect the marginal benefit or cost of hiding income rise. Third, a higher tax rate goes along
with a smaller difference di between actual and fair evasion (
∂di
∂τ
< 0). As the moral cost ψ
is concave in the deviation from fairness (ψ′′ > 0) this effect is positive. Ceteris paribus the
individual willingness to evade taxes increases as hiding more income would boost the actual
tax evasion.
The indirect effect of the tax rate on the moral cost effect of unreported income is captured
by the fourth term of (14). This effect is based on how changes in work effort would affect the
marginal benefit and cost of hiding income which is equivalent to ∂
∂ℓ
∂V
∂u
from expression (10).
To keep the exposition brief, we refer to the interpretation of the indirect effect in expression
(10). In contrast, the individual work effort response is now induced by changes in redistributive
taxation (∂ℓi
∂τ
). Raising work effort would render hiding income more desirable for individuals
receiving an unfairly low net wage ((1 − τ)wi < w¯ ⇒
∂di
∂ℓi
< 0 ⇒ − ∂
∂ℓi
∂V
∂ui
> 0). The opposite
holds for an unfairly high net wage rate ((1− τ)wi > w¯ ⇒
∂di
∂ℓi
> 0⇒ − ∂
∂ℓi
∂V
∂ui
< 0)
Work effort and taxation. Turning to expression (15) the effects of a change in taxation
on the marginal benefit and cost of work effort can be identified. Increasing taxation again
results in a direct effect as well as an indirect effect via a tax-induced change in unreported
income. At first, a higher tax rate would directly reduce the income effect and therefore the
marginal benefit of work effort by−wi. As a higher share of income is claimed by the government
enlarging work effort gets less desirable. The second term captures the effect of taxation on the
influence of work effort on fairness deviation ( ∂di
∂ℓi∂τ
). It can be shown that increasing the tax
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rate reduces ∂di
∂ℓi
by −wi. Therefore, the growth (decline) of di via a work effort increase gets
weaker (stronger) with the tax rate for an unfairly high net wage (unfairly low wage). This
enhances the marginal benefit if an individual evades more taxes than would be fair (di > 0) as
a smaller difference is preferred (ψ′ > 0). In case of an unfairly low level of tax evasion (di < 0)
the opposite holds. Since the individual prefers a larger difference (ψ′ < 0) the tempering effect
of the tax rate on ∂di
∂ℓi
reduces the marginal benefit of work effort. Beyond, the tax rate cuts the
difference between actual and fair tax evasion (∂di
∂τ
< 0) as captured by the third term in the
brackets of expression (15). This effect is negative (positive) when the difference di is decreasing
(increasing) with the work effort.
Again, increasing taxation changes the moral cost effect of work effort via a change in un-
reported income, cf. the fourth term in (15). This effect is equivalent to ∂
∂u
∂V
∂ℓ
as explained
above. Thus we refer to the interpretation of the indirect effect in (10). However, the change
in unreported income would now be induced by a variation of the tax rate. A raise in unre-
ported income would render working more desirable for individuals with an unfairly low net
wage ((1− τ)wi < w¯ ⇒
∂di
∂ℓi
< 0⇒ − ∂
∂ui
∂V
∂ℓi
> 0). If, however, an individual receives an unfairly
high net wage rate, the opposite holds ((1− τ)wi > w¯ ⇒
∂di
∂ℓi
> 0⇒ − ∂
∂ui
∂V
∂ℓi
< 0).
In order to determine the comparative static effects the equation system (14) and (15) has to
be solved. We can show that unreported income is increasing with the tax rate while individual
work effort shrinks with taxation, i.e.
∂u∗i
∂τ
> 0, (16)
∂ℓ∗i
∂τ
< 0, (17)
if either
(i) the actual wage is unfairly low (wi < w¯) and the disutility effect from labor is sufficiently as
well as the change in the detection probability is sufficiently small.6 From wi < w¯ follows
an unfairly low net wage ((1−τ)wi < w¯). In this case, the reduction in labor supply would
reduce di (
∂di
∂ℓi
< 0) which renders hiding income less desirable (− ∂
∂ℓi
∂V
∂ui
> 0), cf. (14).
Thus, the indirect effect is negative. In contrast, it can be shown that the direct effect
of taxation is unambiguously positive. For a sufficiently small labor disutility effect the
positive direct effect dominates the negative indirect effect such that unreported income
u∗i increases in the tax rate τ . Turning to the case of work effort, we can show that for an
unfairly low net wage the indirect effect is negative ((1 − τ)wi < w¯ ⇒
∂di
∂ℓi
< 0) since the
increase in unreported income renders working more desirable at the margin (− ∂
∂ui
∂V
∂ℓi
> 0),
cf. expression (15). By contrast, the direct effect of taxation is negative. For a sufficiently
small change in the detection probability the negative direct effect outweighs the positive
indirect effect such that individual work effort ℓ∗i decreases in taxation τ ;
6We have shown in the appendix that αω′ < w¯ and φ′ < φ′′ ∂di
∂τ
(1 + τwi) must hold.
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(ii) or the actual wage is unfairly high (wi > w¯) and the disutility effect from labor as well
as the change in the detection probability due to a higher ui is sufficiently large.
7 In this
case, the individual net wage could be unfairly high or low and hence the indirect effects
regarding ui and ℓi are positive or negative. Nevertheless, it can be shown that for a
sufficiently large φ′ the direct effect dominates the indirect effects if both differs in sign.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose an unfairly low wage rate and the disutility effect from labor as well as
the change in detection probability to be sufficiently small. Then, unreported income increases
with the tax rate while individuals reduce the work effort. This result also holds for an unfairly
high wage if the disutility effect from labor as well as the change in detection probability are
presumed to be sufficiently large.
Beyond, we can show that if the changes in the moral cost function are supposed to be zero
(ψ′′ = 0) unreported income is unambiguously raising in taxation while work effort is decreasing
with the tax rate. In this case, the indirect, cross effects in (14) and (15) vanishes such that only
the positive direct effect regarding ui and the negative direct effect with respect to ℓi remain.
Thus, changes in the tax policy alters the marginal benefits and costs of using tax evasion
and work effort to alleviate the moral cost which is induced by the deviation from the fair level
of tax evasion. After determining the conditions under which unreported income and work effort
increase or decrease with taxation we turn to the majority voting on redistributive taxation.
4 Majority voting on redistributive taxation
This section considers the political equilibrium regarding the redistributive tax policy consti-
tuted by means of majority voting. Therefore the median voter plays a decisive role for the
majority tax rate (see e.g. Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard, 1981).
It deserves to be mentioned that we presume the moral cost function to be linear in the
difference di between actual and fair tax evasion, i.e. ψ
′′ = 0. A linear moral cost functions
induce the indirect cross effects between reporting income and working to be zero. Thus, the
direct effects remain and we obtain
∂u∗i
∂τ
> 0 and
∂ℓ∗i
∂τ
< 0 irrespective of the functional form
of φ. According to this, unreported income is unambiguously increasing with taxation while
individual work effort decreases with the tax rate.
Beyond, we assume the wage distribution to be right skewed such that the majority of
individuals exhibit a productivity below the average. This seems to reflect empirical observations
adequately. At this, the wage of the median voter is unfairly low, i.e. wm < w¯. For positive tax
rates τ > 0 the net wage is unfairly low, too. Hence, (1− τ)wm < w¯ holds.
7From the appendix follows that αω′ > w¯ and φ′ > φ′′ ∂di
∂τ
(1 + τwi) must hold.
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The median utility under risk neutrality is given by:
V m = (1 − τ)wmℓm +B + τum − φ(um)− αω(ℓm)− βψ(dm), (18)
where m denotes the median voter. Beyond that, the government has to take the fiscal budget
constraint into account, i.e.
B = τ
1
n
∑
i
wiℓi. (19)
According to (19) the average tax yield corresponds to the lumpsum transfer in order to balance
the fiscal budget. Further, the government anticipates the optimal individual decisions regarding
unreported income and work effort. Therefore, the indirect utility
V ∗ := (1− τ)wmℓ
∗
m + τ
1
n
∑
i
wiℓ
∗
i + τu
∗
m − φ(u
∗
m)− αω(ℓ
∗
m)− βψ(d
∗
m) (20)
is maximized with respect to the tax rate τ . This leads to the following first-order condition
for the tax rate:8
−wmℓ
∗
m︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
+w¯ℓ¯︸︷︷︸
(II)
+τw¯
1
n
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(III)
+u∗m︸ ︷︷ ︸
(IV )
−βψ′
∂dm
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(V )
= 0. (21)
Increasing taxation exhibits five marginal effects on median voter utility. To begin with, the
term (I) represents an income effect of redistributive taxation. Increasing the tax rate induces
post-tax income to shrink. Hence, effect (I) is negative and constitutes a marginal cost. Second,
the effect (II) captures a positive income effect. Raising the tax rate ceteris paribus allows to
finance a higher lumpsum transfer. This leads to a higher post-tax income which is utility
enhancing. Therefore, term (II) is a marginal benefit of taxation. The public transfer is also
affected by a change in work effort, cf. term (III). A higher (lower) work effort ceteris paribus
increases (reduces) the tax revenue which enhances (cuts) the post-tax income through a higher
(lower) transfer. Beyond, enlarging the tax rate ceteris paribus goes along with a larger amount
of evaded taxes as captured by effect (IV). This it utility enhancing since post-tax income rises.
Hence, effect (IV) constitutes a marginal benefit of redistributive taxation. Finally, a higher
tax rate induces the deviation from the fair level of tax evasion to shrink (∂di
∂τ
< 0). This is
represented by the moral cost effect of taxation, cf. term (V). The sign of (V) depends on the
actual deviation from fair tax evasion. If the median voter evades less taxes than it would be
fair (di < 0⇒ ψ
′ < 0) the tax-induced reduction in di enlarges the deviation from fairness and
therefore the moral cost. Then, (V) is negative and represents a marginal cost of taxation. If,
however, the median voter evades more than the fair amount of taxes (di > 0⇒ ψ
′ > 0) raising
the tax rate reduces the deviation from fairness as di decreases. This leads to a lower moral
cost and hence gives rise to a marginal benefit.
8For a derivation of the first-order condition (21) as well as the second-order condition we refer to the appendix.
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Fairness preference and the majority tax rate. Next, we strive to analyze the com-
parative static effect with respect to the preference strength β and the tax rate τm resulting
from majority voting. Then, we are able to derive the following comparative static result:
sign
∂τ∗
∂β
= sign [dm]. (22)
if the change in detection probability φ′ induced by a higher unreported income is not too
large.9 Whether the tax rate increases with the preference strength regarding fairness depends
on whether the median voter evades more or less taxes than would be fair. This result is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose the change in detection probability due to the larger unreported income
to be not too large. Then, we can show that the tax rate preferred by the majority increases
(decreases) with the fairness preference if the median voter evades more (less) than the fair
level of taxes.
To provide a further intuition behind this result, we consider the effect of the tax rate on the
deviation from fairness. Raising the tax rate would ceteris paribus lead to a smaller difference
between actual and fair tax evasion. If the median voter evades less taxes than would be fair
higher taxation would then enlarge the deviation from fairness and therefore the moral cost. In
this case, the median voter prefers lower taxation. If, however, the median voter’s tax evasion
exceeds the fair level a higher tax rate would lead to a smaller deviation from fairness. This
reduces the moral cost and thus the median voter prefers higher taxation.
5 Conclusion
This paper sheds some light on how taxation interrelates with the individual decisions on work
effort and the degree of tax evasion if individuals exhibit a desire for fairness concerning the
sources of income inequality and subsequently regarding the level of tax evasion which is per-
ceived as fair. Thereby we employ the fair tax evasion concept of Barth et al. (2013) wich is in
the vein of liberal egalitarian theories on distributive justice. According to this approach, work
effort should be rewarded and is therefore expected to increase the fair income. By contrast,
differences outside an individuals’s reach, i.e. the productivity or the wage rate respectively, are
regarded as unfair and should therefore not be taxed. A similar concept has also been applied
by Alesina et al. (2002) to study redistributive tax policies from a median voter perspective.
We find that introducing or strengthening the fairness preference regarding tax evasion in-
duces individuals evading less taxes than would be fair to reduce the income which is reported
to the tax authorities. If, however, an individual evades an unfairly high amount of taxes, she
responds with a lower unreported income when the fairness preference is introduced. Concern-
ing individual work effort it can be shown that the behaviour depends on whether the individual
9See the appendix for a detailed derivatio of the comparative static effect. We can show that this result holds
if φ′ < min{ τw¯
n
, τwm
¯wφ′′
nαω′′
}.
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is able to reduce the deviation from fair tax evasion and thus the moral cost by working more.
This depends on how the individual net wage as well as the actual tax evasion differs from the
fair levels. Individuals receiving an unfairly high (low) net wage while evading less (more) taxes
than would be fair can reduce the moral cost by increasing labor supply. Hence, introducing
or strengthening the desire for fairness leads to a higher work effort. The opposite holds for
individuals with an unfairly high (low) net wage rate evading more (less) than the fair tax
evasion. In this case, reducing labor supply is capable of decreasing the deviation from fairness
and therefore the moral cost. In a nutshell, individuals are able to reduce the moral cost by
varying unreported income and work effort.
Turning to changes in the tax policy, we obtain the following result. It can be shown that
individuals declare less income to the tax authorities while working less if the tax rate is raised.
We present conditions for which this result holds irrespective of the wage deviation from fairness.
Increasing redistributive taxation affects the marginal benefit and cost of evading taxes and
supplying labor. Our finding shows that the direct effects of taxation dominate, i.e. the higher
amount of taxes which can ceteris paribus avoided as well as the reduction of work incentives.
Beyond, we consider the political equilibrium regarding redistributive taxation. The tax
policy is constituted by means of majority voting. In this case, the median voter decides on
the tax rate. Supposing a right-skewed wage distribution where the median voter receives an
unfairly low net wage, we show how introducing fair tax evasion affects the preferred tax rate.
If the median voter evades more taxes than would be fair the tax rate is increasing with the
fairness preference since taxation reduces the deviation from fairness and therefore the moral
cost. However, if the median voter evades less taxes than would be fair raising the tax rate
enlarges deviation from fairness. This enhances the moral cost such that she prefers lower
taxation.
Finally, there are some remarks which are left open for future research. First, we presumed
individuals to behave risk neutral. This allows us to analyze the effect of fair tax evasion
on individual behavior and the tax policy in separation from responses based on income risk.
Nevertheless, it would be interesting to consider how risk averse individuals behave when they
exhibit fairness preferences regarding tax evasion. Beyond, we omit to analyze the efficiency
properties of the political equilibrium. Fair tax evasion would affect socially optimal taxation
and the deviation of the majority tax rate from the efficient allocation. Eventually, we intro-
duced a linear taxation scheme. It could be questioned which effect fair tax evasion would have
under a non-linear tax policy.
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Appendix (only for the referees)
(Note: In case of publication the following detailed appendix would be condensed.)
For the following derivations we define the first-order conditions as:
F 1 := τ − φ′ − τβψ′ = 0, (A1)
F 2 := (1− τ)wi − αω
′ − βψ′ ·
∂di
∂ℓi
= 0. (A2)
Both conditions together determine the optimal individual amounts of unreported income and
work effort.
Second-order condition with respect to ui and ℓi
The Hessian matrix is given by
H :=
(
F 1u F
1
ℓ
F 2u F
2
ℓ
)
(A3)
with
F 1u = −φ
′′ − βτ2ψ′′, (A4)
F 2u = −βτψ
′′
∂di
∂ℓi
(A5)
F 1ℓ = −βτψ
′′
∂di
∂ℓi
, (A6)
F 2ℓ = −αω
′′ − βψ′′
(
∂di
∂ℓi
)2
. (A7)
We can directly see that due to φ′′ > 0 and ψ′′ > 0 the first principal minor is negative, i.e.
F 1u = −φ
′′ − βτ2ψ′′ < 0. Beyond, the determinant of the Hessian matrix is given by:
|H| = F 1uF
2
ℓ − F
2
uF
1
ℓ =
(
−φ′′ − βτ2ψ′′
)
·
(
−αω′′ − βψ′′
[
∂di
∂ℓi
]2)
−
(
−βτψ′′
∂di
∂ℓi
)
·
(
−βτψ′′
∂di
∂ℓi
)
. (A8)
Expanding and rearranging (A8) then yields:
|H| = αω′′
(
φ′′ + βτ2ψ′′
)
+ βφ′′ψ′′
(
∂di
∂ℓi
)2
> 0, (A9)
and therefore the Hessian matrix is negative definit. Thus, the second-order condition for a
utility maximum is satisfied.
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Comparative statics of ui and ℓi with respect to β
Totally differentiating (A1) and (A2) leads to the equation system
H ·
(
∂ui
∂β
∂ℓi
∂β
)
=
(
−F 1β
−F 2β
)
(A10)
displayed in matrix form for dα = 0, dτ = 0 and dB = 0 with
F 1β = −τψ
′, (A11)
F 2β = −ψ
′
∂di
∂ℓi
, (A12)
where H represents the Hessian matrix as introduced above. Applying Cramer’s Rule then
solves the equation system (A25) to
∂ui
∂β
=
−F 1βF
2
ℓ + F
2
βF
1
ℓ
|H|
(A13)
∂ℓi
∂β
=
−F 1uF
2
β + F
2
uF
1
β
|H|
. (A14)
(i) Unreported income. Since |H| > 0 from (A13) follows
sign
∂ui
∂β
= sign
[
−F 1βF
2
ℓ + F
2
βF
1
ℓ
]
= sign [A], (A15)
where A := −F 1βF
2
ℓ + F
2
βF
1
ℓ . Substituting (A6), (A7), (A11) and (A12) in A gives:
A = −
(
−τψ′
)
·
(
−αω′′ − βψ′′
[
∂di
∂ℓi
]2)
+
(
−ψ′
∂di
∂ℓi
)
·
(
−βτψ′′
∂di
∂ℓi
)
. (A16)
Expanding expression (A16) leads to:
A = −αω′′τψ′ − τβψ′ψ′′
[
∂di
∂ℓi
]2
+ τβψ′ψ′′
[
∂di
∂ℓi
]2
. (A17)
As −τβψ′ψ′′
[
∂di
∂ℓi
]2
+ τβψ′ψ′′
[
∂di
∂ℓi
]2
= 0 we obtain:
A = −αω′′τψ′. (A18)
From (A18) we can derive:
sign
∂ui
∂β
= sign
[
−ψ′
]
. (A19)
since αω′′τ > 0.
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(ii) Work effort. Again, as |H| > 0 we obtain
sign
∂ℓi
∂β
= sign
[
−F 1uF
2
β + F
2
uF
1
β
]
= sign [B], (A20)
from (A14) with B := −F 1uF
2
β + F
2
uF
1
β . Inserting (A4), (A5), (A11) and (A12) in B we can
write:
B = −
(
−φ′′ − βτ2ψ′′
)
·
(
−ψ′
∂di
∂ℓi
)
+
(
−βτψ′′
∂di
∂ℓi
)
·
(
−τψ′
)
(A21)
Multiplying (A21) out yields:
B = −φ′′ψ′
∂di
∂ℓi
− τ2βψ′ψ′′
∂di
∂ℓi
+ τ2βψ′ψ′′
∂di
∂ℓi
. (A22)
Since −τ2βψ′ψ′′ ∂di
∂ℓi
+ τ2βψ′ψ′′ ∂di
∂ℓi
= 0 we get:
B = −φ′′ψ′
∂di
∂ℓi
. (A23)
Then, we can condlude
sign
∂ℓi
∂β
= sign
[
−ψ′
∂di
∂ℓi
]
. (A24)
from (A23) as φ′′ > 0
Comparative statics of ui and ℓi with respect to τ
Totally differentiating (A1) and (A2) leads to the equation system
H ·
(
∂ui
∂τ
∂ℓi
∂τ
)
=
(
−F 1τ
−F 2τ
)
(A25)
displayed in matrix form for dα = 0, dβ = 0 and dB = 0 with
F 1τ = 1− βψ
′ − τβψ′′
∂di
dτ
, (A26)
F 2τ = −wi − βψ
′′
∂di
∂τ
∂di
∂ℓi
+ βψ′wi, (A27)
where H represents the Hessian matrix as defined above. Applying Cramer’s Rule then solves
the equation system (A25) to
∂ui
∂τ
=
−F 1τ F
2
ℓ + F
2
τ F
1
ℓ
|H|
(A28)
∂ℓi
∂τ
=
−F 1uF
2
τ + F
2
uF
1
τ
|H|
. (A29)
(i) Unreported income. To start with, as |H| > 0 from (A28) follows:
sign
∂ui
∂τ
= sign
[
−F 1τ F
2
ℓ + F
2
τ F
1
ℓ
]
, (A30)
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where we denote C := −F 1τ F
2
ℓ + F
2
τ F
1
ℓ . Plugging in (A6), (A7), (A26) and (A27) yields:
C = −
(
1− βψ′ − τβψ′′
∂di
dτ
)
·
(
−αω′′ − βψ′′
[
∂di
∂ℓi
]2)
+
(
−wi − βψ
′′
∂di
∂τ
∂di
∂ℓi
+ βψ′wi
)
·
(
−βτψ′′
∂di
∂ℓi
)
. (A31)
Expanding (A31) we can write:
C = αω′′ − αω′′βψ′ − αω′′βτψ′′
∂di
∂τ
+ βψ′′
[
∂di
∂ℓi
]2
− β2ψ′ψ′′
[
∂di
∂ℓi
]2
+ wiβτ
∂di
∂ℓi
− β2wiτψ
′ψ′′
∂di
∂ℓi
− τβ2[ψ′′]2
∂di
∂τ
[
∂di
∂ℓi
]2
+ τβ2[ψ′′]2
∂di
∂τ
[
∂di
∂ℓi
]2
. (A32)
Taking into account that −τβ2[ψ′′]2 ∂di
∂τ
[
∂di
∂ℓi
]2
+ τβ2[ψ′′]2 ∂di
∂τ
[
∂di
∂ℓi
]2
= 0 and factoring out αω′′
as well as βψ′′, (A32) changes to:
C = αω′′
(
1− βψ′ − βτψ′′
∂di
∂τ
)
+ βψ′′
([
∂di
∂ℓi
]2
− βψ′
[
∂di
∂ℓi
]2
− wiτβψ
′
∂di
∂ℓi
+ wiτ
∂di
∂ℓi
)
. (A33)
From (A2) follows βψ′ ∂di
∂ℓi
= (1− τ)wi − αω
′. Substituting this into (A33) leads to:
C = αω′′
(
1− βψ′ − βτψ′′
∂di
∂τ
)
+ βψ′′
([
∂di
∂ℓi
]2
−
[
(1− τ)wi − αω
′
] ∂di
∂ℓi
− wiτ
[
(1− τ)wi − αω
′
]
+ wiτ
∂di
∂ℓi
)
. (A34)
Rearranging the terms in the brackets of the second term of (A34), we can write:
C = αω′′
(
1− βψ′ − βτψ′′
∂di
∂τ
)
+ βψ′′
([
∂di
∂ℓi
]2
− (1− τ)wi
∂di
∂ℓi
+ αω′
∂di
∂ℓi
− w2i τ(1− τ) + wiταω
′ + wiτ
∂di
∂ℓi
)
. (A35)
Using ∂di
∂ℓi
= −w¯ + wi − τwi in (A35) gives:
C = αω′′
(
1− βψ′ − βτψ′′
∂di
∂τ
)
+ βψ′′
(
[−w¯ + wi − τwi]
2
− (1− τ)wi[−w¯ + wi − τwi] + αω
′[−w¯ + wi − τwi]
− w2i τ + w
2
i τ
2 + wiταω
′ + wiτ [−w¯ + wi − τwi]
)
. (A36)
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Using the rule for trinomials (a + b + c)2 = a2 + b2 + c2 + 2ab + 2ac + 2bc and expanding the
brackets in the second term leads to:
C = αω′′
(
1− βψ′ − βτψ′′
∂di
∂τ
)
+ βψ′′
(
w¯2 + w2i + τ
2w2i − 2w¯wi
+ 2τw¯wi − 2τw
2
i + wiw¯ − w
2
i + τw
2
i − τwiw¯ + τw
2
i − τ
2w2i − αω
′w¯
+ αω′wi − αω
′τwi −w
2
i τ + w
2
i τ
2 + wiταω
′ − τwiw¯ + τw
2
i − τ
2w2i
)
. (A37)
Then, taking into account that τ2w2i−τ
2w2i = 0, wiταω
′−αω′τwi = 0, w
2
i−w
2
i = 0, τw
2
i−w
2
i τ =
0, w2i τ
2−w2i τ
2 = 0, 2τw¯wi−τwiw¯−τwiw¯ = 0 as well as τw
2
i +τw
2
i −2τw
2
i = 0 and rearranging
(A36) results in:
C = αω′′
(
1− βψ′ − βτψ′′
∂di
∂τ
)
+ βψ′′
(
w¯2 − w¯wi + αω
′[wi − w¯]
)
. (A38)
From (A1) follows βψ′ = 1− φ
′
τ
. Inserting this into (A38) and rearranging the second bracket
term yields:
C = αω′′
(
φ′
τ
− βτψ′′
∂di
∂τ
)
+ βψ′′
(
w¯(w¯ − wi) + αω
′[wi − w¯]
)
. (A39)
Finally, (A39) can be rearranged to:
C = αω′′
(
φ′
τ
− βτψ′′
∂di
∂τ
)
+ βψ′′(wi − w¯)
(
αω′ − w¯
)
. (A40)
We can see that the first term of (A40) (direct effect) is unambiguously positive due to αω′′ > 0,
φ′
τ
> 0 and βτψ′′ ∂di
∂τ
< 0. In contrast, the second term of (A40) (indirect effect) is indeterminate
in sign. It becomes positive if sign (wi− w¯) = sign (αω
′ − w¯). Thus, for wi > w¯ and αω
′ > w¯ or
wi < w¯ and αω
′ < w¯ the term gets positive such that C is unambiguously positive. In this case
we get ∂ui
∂τ
> 0. If, however, sign (wi − w¯) = −sign (αω
′ − w¯) the second term is negative. This
holds for wi < w¯ and αω
′ > w¯ or wi > w¯ and αω
′ < w¯. Then, C remains positive if ψ′′ = 0 and
hence ∂ui
∂τ
> 0 follows.
(ii) Work effort. Furthermore, from (A29) and |H| > 0 we can derive
sign
∂ℓi
∂τ
= sign
[
−F 1uF
2
τ + F
2
uF
1
τ
]
. (A41)
with D := −F 1uF
2
τ + F
2
uF
1
τ . Again, by using (A4), (A5), (A26) and (A27) we obtain:
D = −
(
−φ′′ − βτ2ψ′′
)
·
(
−wi − βψ
′′
∂di
∂τ
∂di
∂ℓi
+ βψ′wi
)
+
(
−βτψ′′
∂di
∂ℓi
)
·
(
1− βψ′ − τβψ′′
∂di
dτ
)
. (A42)
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Multiplying out the brackets yields:
D = −wiφ
′′ − βφ′′ψ′′
∂di
∂τ
∂di
∂ℓi
+ βφ′′ψ′wi − wiτ
2βψ′′ − β2τ2[ψ′′]2
∂di
∂τ
∂di
∂ℓi
+ β2τ2ψ′ψ′′wi − τβψ
′′
∂di
∂ℓi
+ β2τψ′ψ′′
∂di
∂ℓi
+ τ2β2[ψ′′]2
∂di
∂τ
∂di
∂ℓi
. (A43)
Taking into account that τ2β2[ψ′′]2 ∂di
∂τ
∂di
∂ℓi
− β2τ2[ψ′′]2 ∂di
∂τ
∂di
∂ℓi
= 0 and factoring out φ′′wi as well
as βψ′′, (A43) is rewritten to:
D = φ′′wi
(
βψ′ − 1
)
+ βψ′′
(
−φ′′
∂di
∂τ
∂di
∂ℓi
− wiτ
2 + βτ2ψ′wi − τ
∂di
∂ℓi
+ βτψ′
∂di
∂ℓi
)
. (A44)
Making use of ∂di
∂ℓi
= −w¯ + wi − τwi gives:
D = φ′′wi
(
βψ′ − 1
)
+ βψ′′
(
− φ′′
∂di
∂τ
[−w¯ + wi − τwi]− wiτ
2 + βτ2ψ′wi
− τ [−w¯ + wi − τwi] + βτψ
′[−w¯ + wi − τwi]
)
. (A45)
Rearranging (A45) leads to:
D = φ′′wi
(
βψ′ − 1
)
+ βψ′′
(
− φ′′
∂di
∂τ
[−w¯ + wi − τwi]− wiτ
2 + βτ2ψ′wi
+ τw¯ − τwi + τ
2wi − βτψ
′w¯ + βτψ′wi − βτ
2ψ′wi
)
. (A46)
Consider that τ2wi − wiτ
2 = 0 as well as βτ2ψ′wi − βτ
2ψ′wi = 0 and rearranging (A46) we
obtain:
D = φ′′wi
(
βψ′ − 1
)
+ βψ′′(w¯ − wi)
(
φ′′
∂di
∂τ
[1 + τwi] + τ
[
1− βψ′
])
. (A47)
From (A1) follows βψ′ = 1− φ
′
τ
. Substituting this into (A47) and rearranging gives:
D = −
φ′φ′′wi
τ
+ βψ′′τ(w¯ − wi)
(
φ′′
∂di
∂τ
[1 + τwi] + φ
′
)
. (A48)
We can directly see that the first term of (A48) is unambiguously negative due to φ′ > 0 and
φ′′ > 0. However, the second term is per se indeterminate in sign. It becomes negative for i)
wi > w¯ and φ
′ > φ′′ ∂di
∂τ
(1 + τwi) or if ii) wi < w¯ and φ
′ < φ′′ ∂di
∂τ
(1 + τwi). In these cases, both
terms are negative and thus D is unambiguously negative. This leads to
∂ℓ∗i
∂τ
< 0. If i) or ii) do
not hold the second term is positive and hence the sign of D is not clear. In case of ψ′′ = 0, the
second term vanishes and then D turns negative such that
∂ℓ∗i
∂τ
< 0.
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First-order condition for τ
In the following we presume the moral cost function to be linear, i.e. ψ′′ = 0. For ψ′′ = 0
the comparative static effects of um and ℓm regarding the tax rate τ as well as the fairness
preference β change to:
∂u∗m
∂β
= −
τψ′
φ′′
, (A49)
∂ℓ∗m
∂β
= −
ψ′
αω′′
∂dm
∂ℓm
, (A50)
∂u∗m
∂τ
=
φ′
τφ′′
, (A51)
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ
= −
wiφ
′
ταω′′
. (A52)
We differentiate indirect utility (18) with respect to the tax rate τ :
∂V ∗
∂τ
= −wmℓm + (1− τ)wm
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ
+ w¯ℓ¯+ τw¯
1
n
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ
+ u∗m
+ τ
∂u∗m
∂τ
− φ′
∂u∗m
∂τ
− αω′
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ
− βψ′
[
∂dm
∂τ
+
∂dm
∂um
∂u∗m
∂τ
+
∂dm
∂ℓm
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ
]
= 0. (A53)
Then, (A53) can be rearranged to:
∂V ∗
∂τ
= −wmℓm + w¯ℓ¯+ τw¯
1
n
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ
+ u∗m − βψ
′
∂dm
∂τ
+
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ
[
(1− τ)wm − αω
′ − βψ′
∂dm
∂ℓm
]
+
∂u∗m
∂τ
[
τ − φ′ − βψ′
∂dm
∂um
]
= 0. (A54)
Substituting ∂dm
∂um
= τ and making use of the first-order conditions (A1) and (A2) we can directly
see that the second and third line of (A54) vanishes. Thus, the first-order condition for the tax
rate is given by:
∂V ∗
∂τ
= −wmℓ
∗
m + w¯ℓ¯+ τw¯
1
n
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ
+ u∗m − βψ
′
∂dm
∂τ
= 0. (A55)
Second-order condition for τ
Differentiating (A55) with respect to the tax rate τ yields:
∂2V ∗
∂τ2
= −wm
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ
+ w¯
1
n
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ
+ τw¯
1
n
∂2ℓ∗m
∂τ2
+
∂u∗m
∂τ
− βψ′
∂2d∗m
∂τ2
. (A56)
As ∂
2d∗m
∂τ2
= ∂u
∗
m
∂τ
− wm
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ
we can write:
∂2V ∗
∂τ2
= −wm
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ
+ w¯
1
n
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ
+ τw¯
1
n
∂2ℓ∗m
∂τ2
+
∂u∗m
∂τ
− βψ′
[
∂u∗m
∂τ
−wm
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ
]
. (A57)
24
By rearranging (A57) we obtain:
∂2V ∗
∂τ2
=
∂ℓ∗m
∂τ
[
w¯
n
− wm + βψ
′wm
]
+ τ
w¯
n
∂2ℓ∗m
∂τ2
+
∂u∗m
∂τ
[
1− βψ′
]
. (A58)
Then, we substitute (A51), (A52) as well as βψ′ = 1 − φ
′
τ
from (A1) into (A58) in order to
write:
∂2V ∗
∂τ2
=
(
−
wmφ
′
ταω′′
)[
w¯
n
− wm + wm
(
1−
φ′
τ
)]
+ τ
w¯
n
∂2ℓ∗m
∂τ2
+
φ′
τφ′′
[
−
φ′
τ
]
. (A59)
From (A52) follows ∂
2ℓ∗m
∂τ2
=
[
− wm
αω′′
(
− φ
′
τ2
+ φ
′
τ
)]
as third partial derivatives are supposed to be
zero, i.e. ω′′′ = 0. Using this in (A59) we get:
∂2V ∗
∂τ2
=
(
−
wiφ
′
ταω′′
)[
w¯
n
− wm + wm
(
1−
φ′
τ
)]
+ τ
w¯
n
[
−
wm
αω′′
(
−
φ′
τ2
+
φ′
τ
)]
+
φ′
τφ′′
[
−
φ′
τ
]
. (A60)
We rearrange (A60) to obtain:
∂2V ∗
∂τ2
= −
wmφ
′
ταω′′
[
w¯
n
−
wmφ
′
τ
]
+
τw¯
n
[
wmφ
′
αω′′τ2
−
wmφ
′
αω′′τ
]
−
[φ′]2
τ2φ′′
. (A61)
Multypling out the brackets in (A61) yields:
∂2V ∗
∂τ2
= −
wmw¯φ
′
nταω′′
+
w2m[φ
′2]
αω′′τ2
+
wmw¯φ
′
nταω′′
−
wmw¯φ
′
nαω′′
−
[φ′]2
τ2φ′′
. (A62)
We take into account that wmw¯φ
′
nταω′′
− wmw¯φ
′
nταω′′
= 0 in order to obtain:
∂2V ∗
∂τ2
=
w2m[φ
′2]
αω′′τ2
+
wmw¯φ
′
nταω′′
−
[φ′]2
τ2φ′′
. (A63)
Finally, by rearranging (A63) changes to:
∂2V ∗
∂τ2
=
(
φ′
τ
)2 [ w2m
αω′′
−
1
φ′′
]
−
wmw¯φ
′
nαω′′
. (A64)
The second term of (A64) is unambiguously negative. Turning to the first term, we can see that(
φ′
τ
)2
> 0 while the bracket term is indeterminate in sign. The first term w
2
m
αω′′
in the brackets
is positive and the second term − 1
φ′′
is negative. The term in brackets becomes negative if
w2m
αω′′
− 1
φ′′
< 0. This holds for αω′′ > w2mφ
′′ which constitutes a sufficient condition for the
second-order condition to be satisfied, i.e. ∂
2V ∗
∂τ2
< 0.
25
Comparative static effect of τ with respect to β
Implicitly differentiating the first-order condition for the tax rate with respect to the preference
parameter β yields:
∂τ∗
∂β
= −
∂V ∗
∂τ∂β
∂2V ∗
∂τ2
. (A65)
As the second-order condition regarding taxation is satisfied, ∂
2V ∗
∂τ2
< 0, we obtain
sign
∂τ∗
∂β
= sign
[
∂V ∗
∂τ∂β
]
, (A66)
with
∂V ∗
∂τ∂β
= −wm
∂ℓ∗m
∂β
+ w¯
1
n
∂ℓ∗m
∂β
+ τw¯
1
n
∂2ℓ∗m
∂τ∂β
+
∂u∗m
∂β
− ψ′
∂dm
∂τ
− βψ′
∂2dm
∂τ∂β
. (A67)
From ∂dm
∂τ
= um − wmℓm follows
∂2dm
∂τ∂β
=
∂u∗m
∂β
− wm
∂ℓ∗m
∂β
. (A68)
Substituting (A68) as well as
∂2ℓ∗m
∂τ∂β
= −
wmφ
′′
ταω′′
∂u∗m
∂β
, (A69)
derived from (A52) into (A67), we can write:
∂V ∗
∂τ∂β
= −wm
∂ℓ∗m
∂β
+ w¯
1
n
∂ℓ∗m
∂β
+ τw¯
1
n
(
−
wmφ
′′
ταω′′
∂u∗m
∂β
)
+
∂u∗m
∂β
− ψ′
∂dm
∂τ
− βψ′
[
∂u∗m
∂β
− wm
∂ℓ∗m
∂β
]
. (A70)
Rearranging (A70) then yields:
∂V ∗
∂τ∂β
=
∂ℓ∗m
∂β
[
w¯
n
− wm + wmβψ
′
]
+
∂u∗m
∂β
[
1−
wmw¯φ
′′
nαω′′
− βψ′
]
− ψ′
∂dm
∂τ
. (A71)
We substitute (A49), (A50) and βψ′ = 1− φ
′
τ
from (A1) in order to get:
∂V ∗
∂τ∂β
=
(
−
ψ′
αω′′
∂dm
∂ℓm
)[
w¯
n
− wm + wm
(
1−
φ′
τ
)]
+
(
−
τψ′
φ′′
)[
φ′
τ
−
wmw¯φ
′′
nαω′′
]
− ψ′
∂dm
∂τ
, (A72)
Finally, we rearrange (A72) and obtain:
∂V ∗
∂τ∂β
= −
ψ′
αω′′
∂dm
∂ℓm
[
w¯
n
−
φ′
τ
]
− ψ′
[
φ′
φ′′
−
τwmw¯
nαω′′
]
− ψ′
∂dm
∂τ
, (A73)
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We assumed wm < w¯ and therefore (1 − τ)wm < w¯ ⇒
∂dm
∂ℓm
< 0 follows. The bracket in the
first term is positive if w¯
n
− φ
′
τ
> 0. This holds for φ′ < τw¯
n
. In contrast, the bracket in the
second term is negative if φ
′
φ′′
− τwmw¯
nαω′′
< 0. Thus, the negative sign of the bracket term holds
for φ′ < τwm
¯wφ′′
nαω′′
. Using the relation φ′ < min{ τw¯
n
, τwm
¯wφ′′
nαω′′
} we can state that the overall
expression (A73) is positive and therefore ∂V
∗
∂τ∂β
> 0 when dm < 0 ⇒ ψ
′ < 0. In this case, we
obtain ∂τ
∗
∂β
> 0 according to (A66). Vice versa, if dm > 0 ⇒ ψ
′ > 0 expression (A73) becomes
negative and therefore ∂τ
∗
∂β
< 0 holds. Then, from (A66) we can derive the result ∂τ
∗
∂β
. If,
however, φ′ > min{ τw¯
n
, τwm
¯wφ′′
nαω′′
} the sign of expression (A73) remains unclear.
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